Unprincipled Virtue

Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195179765
Size: 48.48 MB
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Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave.

In Praise Of Desire

Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199348162
Size: 33.91 MB
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"'In Praise of Desire' aims to show that ordinary desires belong at the heart of moral psychology, basing its thesis on a doctrine called Spare Conativism. It gives a full defence of the central role intrinsic desires have in our moral lives".

Merit Meaning And Human Bondage

Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 9781400824502
Size: 12.60 MB
Format: PDF, ePub
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Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in some way to reasons, our actions are meaningful and can be judged on their moral (or other) merit. In this highly original work, Nomy Arpaly argues that a deterministic world does not preclude moral responsibility, rationality, and love--in short, meaningful lives--but that there would still be something lamentable about a deterministic world. A person may respond well to reasons, and her actions may faithfully reflect her true self or values, but she may still feel that she is not free. Arpaly argues that compatibilists and semicompatibilists are wrong to dismiss this feeling--for which there are no philosophical consolations--as philosophically irrelevant. On the way to this bittersweet conclusion, Arpaly sets forth surprising theories about acting for reasons, the widely accepted idea that "ought implies can," moral blame, and more.

Responsibility Character And The Emotions

Author: Ferdinand Schoeman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521339513
Size: 77.63 MB
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An examination of the responsibility individuals have for their actions and characters.

Who Knew

Author: George Sher
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199744963
Size: 66.31 MB
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
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Unlike most other discussions of responsibility, which focus on the idea that to be responsible, agents must in some sense act voluntarily, this book focuses on the relatively neglected idea that they must in some sense know what they are doing. Because it integrates first-and-third personal elements, this account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.

On Virtue Ethics

Author: Rosalind Hursthouse
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 9780191519369
Size: 53.51 MB
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Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, now presents a full exposition and defence of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions. Deliberately avoiding a combative stance, she finds less disagreement between Kantian and neo-Aristotelian approaches than is usual, and she offers the first account from a virtue ethics perspective of acting 'from a sense of duty'. She considers the question which character traits are virtues, and explores how answers to this question can be justified by appeal to facts about human nature. Written in a clear, engaging style which makes it accessible to non-specialists, On Virtue Ethics will appeal to anyone with an interest in moral philosophy.

Consciousness And Moral Responsibility

Author: Neil Levy
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198704631
Size: 18.39 MB
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Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness—the global workspace view—and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.

The Nature Of Moral Responsibility

Author: Randolph Clarke
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199998078
Size: 29.63 MB
Format: PDF, Mobi
View: 4359
Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement about what it is to be morally responsible for something. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers.

Responsibility From The Margins

Author: David Shoemaker
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198715676
Size: 22.47 MB
Format: PDF, Mobi
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David Shoemaker presents a new pluralistic theory of responsibility, based on the idea of quality of will. His approach is motivated by our ambivalence to real-life cases of marginal agency, such as those caused by clinical depression, dementia, scrupulosity, psychopathy, autism, intellectual disability, and poor formative circumstances. Our ambivalent responses suggest that such agents are responsible in some ways but not others. Shoemaker develops a theory to account for our ambivalence, via close examination of several categories of pan-cultural emotional responsibility responses (sentiments) and their appropriateness conditions. The result is three distinct types of responsibility, each with its own set of required capacities: attributability, answerability, and accountability. Attributability is about the having and expressing of various traits of character, and it is the target of a range of aretaic sentiments and emotional practices organized around disdain and admiration. Answerability is about one's capacity to govern one's actions and attitudes by one's evaluative judgments about the worth of various practical reasons, and it is the target of a range of sentiments and emotional practices organized around regret and pride. Accountability is about one's ability to regard others, both evaluatively and emotionally, and it is the target of a range of sentiments and emotional practices organized around anger and gratitude. In Part One of the book, this tripartite theory is developed and defended. In Part Two of the book, the tripartite theory's predictions about specific marginal cases are tested, once certain empirical details about the nature of those agents have been filled in and discussed.

What Is Good And Why

Author: Richard Kraut
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674027086
Size: 71.51 MB
Format: PDF, ePub
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What is good, how do we know, and how important is it? In this book, one of our most respected analytical philosophers reorients these questions around the notion of what causes human beings to flourish. Observing that we can sensibly address what is good for plants and animals no less than what is good for people, Kraut applies a general principle to the entire living world: what is good for complex organisms consists in the exercise of their natural powers.