Committees Agendas And Voting

Author: N. Miller
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1136460608
Size: 76.37 MB
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The text is technically precise but at the same time accessible, and is carried forward by numerous examples. The chapters focus on vote counting rules, voting agendas, voter preferences, sincere and sophisticated voting strategies, solution sets, voting outcomes, agendas control, and agenda formation. The author himself has made prior research contributions to a number of these topics.

The Welfare Economics Of International Trade

Author: Murray C. Kemp
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9783718653829
Size: 35.59 MB
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This volume provides a careful account of the leading propositions about the welfare gains associated with international trade and investment under differing institutional arrangements and policy choices. It concentrates on exploring two propositions which are valid for economies of any size; the first being the assertion of the gainfulness of free trade for a single free-trading country, and a second, more general proposition about the welfare economics of customs unions. Both the logic and implementability of these propositions are assessed, as is their relevance to the formation of commercial policy. Murray c. Kemp is Research Professor of Economics at the University of New South Wales, Australia. He has also taught at McGill University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. Henry Y. Wan, Jr. is Research Professor of Economics at Cornell University. He has also taught at the National Taiwan University, University of California at Davis, USA and Fudan University, PRC.

Harwood Fundamentals Of Pure And Applied Economics

Author: J. Lesourne
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 9780415269070
Size: 75.54 MB
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The Harwood Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics series was a groundbreaking attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of modern economics. A series of short books - arranged into thematic sections - provides state-of-the-art accounts of key areas within the discipline. Although never completed, the series produced several landmark books. It is notable for: * charting the emergence of vibrant new areas of economics (eg 'positive' political economy) * the numerous examples it gives of major innovations like game theory and the new institutional economics re-vitalizing traditional areas of economics * attracting some of the most talented economists of its generation, including Avinash Dixit, Drew Fudenberg, Thomas Palfrey and Jean Tirole This collection reprints the series in its entirety, making all titles available in hardback for the first time, either as individual volumes, or bound together in mini-sets organized by sub-discipline.

Signaling Games In Political Science

Author: Jeffrey S. Banks
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 3718650878
Size: 54.40 MB
Format: PDF
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First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Books In Print

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Size: 48.69 MB
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Books in print is the major source of information on books currently published and in print in the United States. The database provides the record of forthcoming books, books in-print, and books out-of-print.

The Strategic Constitution

Author: Robert Cooter
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 9780691096209
Size: 12.10 MB
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Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.